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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Mr. Smith asserts that the State has failed to demonstrate any error in the district
court's order granting his motion to suppress the State's evidence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Terry Smith was charged with trafficking in marijuana based upon the State's
allegation that Mr. Smith had possessed more than five pounds of marijuana.
p.26.)

(R.,

The State's charge was the result of a traffic stop that allegedly uncovered

approximately eight pounds of marijuana.

(R., pp.3-6.) Thereafter, Mr. Smith filed a

motion to dismiss. 1 (R., p.4D.) In his memorandum in support of this motion, Mr. Smith
raised two challenges to his detention and the search of his vehicle.

First, Mr. Smith

asserted that the officer who performed the traffic stop unlawfully extended his detention
for the offense of speeding in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

(R., pp.44-49.)

Second, Mr. Smith asserted that the officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to
require him to exit his car and to use a drug dog to sniff the exterior of his vehicle once
the purpose of the traffic stop had been completed. (R., pp.44-49.) Mr. Smith provided
the district court with police reports and a transcript of the preliminary hearing in support
of his motion to suppress. (R., pp.51-112.)
The police incident report and preliminary hearing transcript reflect that Mr. Smith
had been stopped by Officer Tyler Scheierman for speeding.

(R., pp.53, 73-74.)

1 This motion was properly characterized by the district court as subsuming a motion to
suppress the State's evidence in light of the nature of Mr. Smith's claims and the relief
requested. (R., p.148.)
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Mr. Smith acknowledged the violation and provided Officer Scheierman his license and

registration upon the officer's request.

(R., pp.53, 76.)

However, rather than

immediately run a check on his license, the officer decided to ask Mr. Smith questions
unrelated to the traffic offense. (R., p.53.) While Mr. Smith was still being detained, and
prior to running any checks on his license and registration, Officer Scheierman
questioned Mr. Smith regarding "his travels," including both where he was going to and
where he was coming from.

The officer testified at the preliminary hearing that he

questions people regarding where they are coming from and going to in every single
traffic stop he performs. (R., pp.71-72.) Because Mr. Smith paused for "two seconds"
during questioning, had maps, garbage, and a food cooler in his car, and didn't have a
lot of luggage, Officer Scheierman was suspicious. (R., pp.53, 76-81.) According to the
officer's own estimate, he remained at Mr. Smith's car and questioned him for
approximately five to seven minutes. (R., pp.80-81.)
The officer eventually stopped questioning Mr. Smith and returned to the task of
checking his license and registration. This check revealed that Mr. Smith had a valid
license and no outstanding warrants.

(R., pp.53, 82.)

But instead of writing out a

citation for Mr. Smith's speeding violation, Officer Scheierman then decided to run
additional checks on Mr. Smith and also requested assistance from another officer. (R.,
pp.53, 82.) According to the officer's testimony, he has performed a nationwide search
for outstanding warrants on every individual that he has ever stopped for a traffic
violation.

(R., p.83.)

Again, without writing out a citation for speeding, Officer

Scheierman also returned to Mr. Smith's car, ordered him out of the vehicle, and
continued to question him about matters unrelated to the speeding violation. (R., p.53.)

2

The officer admitted that it was not normal for him to order a driver out of his or her
vehicle during a routine traffic stop.

(R., p.94.) Mr. Smith was also patted down for

weapons while outside the car. (R., p.S3.)
During the process of the second questioning of Mr. Smith, the second officer
arrived. (R., pp.S3-S4.) Officer Scheierman believed that Mr. Smith's eyes were "glassy
and glazed over" at the time of this questioning.

(R., pp.S4, 8S.)

Because Officer

Scheierman knew that Colorado had medicinal marijuana laws, the officer also asked
Mr. Smith if he was traveling with a medical marijuana card.

(R., p.8S.)

Mr. Smith

admitted to having a medical marijuana card and provided it to Officer Scheierman. (R.,
pp.S4, 8S-86.) He refused, however, to allow the officer to search his car. (R., pp.S4,
86-87.)
It was only after removing Mr. Smith from the car, patting down his person upon
removing him, and questioning him a second time about matters unrelated to his
speeding violation that Officer Scheierman further extended the traffic stop by using a
drug detection dog to sniff the exterior of Mr. Smith's car. (R., p.S4.) The nationwide
check had actually returned by the time the officer was getting his drug detection dog in
order to run the sniff test on Mr. Smith's vehicle.

(R., p.87.)

The results of the

nationwide check revealed that Mr. Smith did not have a driver's license in any other
state and had no warrants in any other state.

(R., p.96.)

Upon being deployed by

Officer Scheierman, the drug dog allegedly alerted to the vehicle. (R., p.S4.)
Officer Scheierman then searched the inside of Mr. Smith's car. (R., pp.S4, 89.)
He opened a suit case inside the car.
garbage bags.

(R., pp.S4, 89.)

(R., pp.S4, 89.) Inside were two large, black

Inside of those bags were additional, smaller bags
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containing what the officer believed to be marijuana.

(R., pp.54, 89.) At this point,

Officer Scheierman instructed the second officer to handcuff Mr. Smith, who was then
placed in the back of the officer's vehicle.

(R., p.54.)

A subsequent search of

Mr. Smith's car revealed $1,350 in cash in another bag and a box of garbage bags. (R.,
p.54.) The total weight of the substance alleged to be marijuana that was found in the
car was approximately eight pounds. (R., p.55.)
In response, the State asserted that the use of the drug detection dog by Officer
Scheierman did not prolong the detention of Mr. Smith.

(R., pp.123-130.)

In the

alternative, the State argued that any extension of the traffic stop by the use of the drug
detection dog was constitutionally permissible because it was supported by reasonable,
articulable suspicion.

(R., pp.123-130.)

The State also argued that it was

constitutionally permissible for a law enforcement officer to request that an individual
exit the vehicle during a traffic stop. (R., pp.129-130.) But the State never addressed
Mr. Smith's claims that the officer's prolonged questioning on matters entirely unrelated
to the traffic stop unlawfully extended the duration of his detention. (R., ppA5-49, 123130.)

Mr. Smith reiterated his arguments regarding the unlawful extension of his

detention during the traffic stop in his reply memorandum, including that the unlawful
extension of the traffic stop included the protacted questioning by Officer Scheierman
on matters unrelated to the alleged traffic offense. (R., pp.137-142.)
At the hearing on Mr. Smith's motion to suppress the State's evidence and
dismiss the charge against him, the State presented only the testimony of Officer
Scheierman. (Tr., p.3, L.23 - pA, L.3.) The officer testified consistently with his prior
testimony at the preliminary hearing. (Tr., p.8, L.10 - pA4, L.21) Officer Scheierman
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added that the check specifically for whether Mr. Smith's license was valid and for
warrant's in his home state of Colorado took one about one minute to complete. (Tr.,
p.14, Ls.13-20.)

In contrast, the nationwide background check that the officer also

chose to run took approximately five minutes to complete. (Tr., p.15, Ls.14-24.) Officer
Scheierman further testified that he never bothered to write up any ticket for Mr. Smith's
traffic offense at any point during the traffic stop. (Tr., p.26, L.23 - p.27, L.12.)
Following the testimony of Officer Scheierman and the arguments of the parties,
the district court took Mr. Smith's motion to suppress and to dismiss the case under
advisement.

(Tr., p.64, Ls.9-25.)

The district court ultimately granted Mr. Smith's

motion to dismiss. (R., pp.148-163.) The State timely appealed from the district court's
order granting Mr. Smith's motion to dismiss. (R., p.174.)

5

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it granted Mr. Smith's motion to suppress the State's
evidence?

6

ARGUMENT

The District Court Correctly Granted Mr. Smith's Motion To Suppress The State's
Evidence

A.

Standard of Review
This Court applies a bifurcated standard of review upon a challenge to a trial

court's ruling on a motion to suppress.

First, this Court defers to the district court's

findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous.

See, e.g., State v.

Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482,485 (2009). This Court also gives deference to any implicit
findings of fact that are supported by substantial and competent evidence.

State v.

Frank, 133 Idaho 364, 367 (Ct. App. 1999). Second, this Court reviews de novo the trial
court's application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.

Willoughby, 147

Idaho at 485-486.

B.

The District Court Correctly Granted Mr. Smith's Motion To Suppress The State's
Evidence
The State has not challenged any of the district court's factual findings in this

appeal. As such, the question for this Court is whether, in light of the facts as found by
the district court, the district court erred in granting Mr. Smith's motion to suppress the
State's evidence. Mr. Smith submits that the district court's ruling granting his motion to
suppress was amply supported both by the evidence and by governing case law, and
that this Court should therefore affirm the district court.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution secures to the people
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Willoughby, 147
Idaho 482, 486 (2009).

The protections of the Fourth Amendment have been
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incorporated to apply to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810(2009).
"When a defendant moves to exclude evidence on the grounds that it was
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the government carries the burden of
proving that the search or seizure in question was reasonable." Id. at 811. In addition,
even brief detentions of individuals must meet with the Fourth Amendment's
requirement of reasonableness.

Id.

This means that the detention must be both

justified at its inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that
originally justified the interference in the first place. Id.
Limited detentions of individuals may be permissible where there is reasonable,
articulable suspicion on the part of the officer that the person detained has committed,
or is about to commit, a crime. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811. However, the officer must be
able to point to specific, articulable facts in support of the detention - and this requires
more than a mere hunch on the part of the officer or "inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion." Id. (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)). Whether an
officer possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion is evaluated by examining the
totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of, or before, the detention.
Id.

Moreover, the "scope of the detention must be narrowly tailored to its underlying

justification," and the investigative detention cannot last any longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
These same standards apply where the detention at issue is a traffic stop. See,
e.g., State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct.App. 2005). "The question whether an

investigative detention is reasonable requires a dual inquiry into (1) whether the officer's
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action was justified at its inception, and (2) whether it is reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."

!d.

While the

purpose of a stop is not inevitably fixed at the point of the initiation of the traffic stop,
and may evolve based upon additional information coming to light, any extension of the
detention must be carefully tailored to the underlying justification of the stop. Id. at 562563.
In this case, the State has challenged the district court's determination that the
stop of Mr. Smith for speeding was unlawfully extended, and therefore the evidence
obtained as a result of this detention must be suppressed.

The State's argument

erroneously looks to one sentence in the district court's order where the court notes an
admission made by Officer Scheierman in which the officer admits to departing from his
normal routine for a traffic stop.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.)

In doing so, the State

attempts to cast this single statement - taken in complete isolation from the context of
the court's entire order - as the basis for the court's holding. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.)
However, a review of the totality of the court's order reveals this interpretation to be
unsupported by the record.
The district court did acknowledge, at one point in its order, a statement made by
Officer Scheierman that included the officer's belief that he had reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity after he initially contacted and questioned Mr. Smith.

(R., p.158.)

However, the trial court's legal analysis had nothing to do with the officer's personal
belief, but rather looked to the second portion of the officer's statement - that he was
going to "inquire further" of Mr. Smith on matters unrelated to his traffic offense coupled with a thorough examination of the officer's own actions as objective evidence
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that the traffic stop had been unlawfully extended. (R., pp.156-163.) This much is clear
from the district court's statement that, "the focus is on the conduct itself and whether it
can be supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity."

(R.,

p,162.)
Moreover, to the extent that the district court did consider any portion of the
officer's statement of personal belief, the context surrounding this remark shows that the
district court was merely making an adverse credibility determination regarding Officer
Scheierman's claim that he was treating the stop of Mr. Smith as a routine traffic stop.
(R., pp.157-158.) In the passage immediately preceding the remarks challenged by the

State as the court's "holding," the district court canvassed the officer's testimony that
tended to imply that the actions taken by Officer Scheierman were part of the routine
that he follows for every traffic stop. (R., pp.157-158.) In noting that the officer himself
was more concerned about criminal activity being afoot, and focusing on the officer's
decision to investigate this hunch that was unrelated to Mr. Smith's speeding offense,
the court was rejecting Officer Scheierman's testimony that all of his actions were
merely part of the routine he followed for every traffic stop.

Decisions regarding the

credibility of the evidence, as well as inferences from the evidence, are solely within the
province of the trial court. See, e.g., Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810. Because the district
court was empowered to make just such a credibility determination, there was nothing
improper in the court noting the inconsistencies in Officer Scheierman's testimony.
Turning to the court's actual holding in this case, the court correctly held that
Officer Scheierman had abandoned the purpose of the traffic stop and unlawfully
extended this stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court in this case
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correctly held that reasonable suspicion on the part of the officer did not exist prior to
the officer returning to question Mr. Smith a second time on matters unrelated to his
speeding violation, at which point the officer observed that Mr. Smith's eyes appeared
glassy.2 In finding that the actions of the officer prior to this period unlawfully extended
the traffic stop, the court also limited its analysis to the objective facts shown by the
evidence: both what the officer did during the course of the traffic stop, and - as
important- what the officer failed to do.
The district court engaged in a fairly detailed examination of Officer Scheierman's
actions with regard to the traffic stop.

It noted that the officer's initial approach and

interrogation of Mr. Smith took between five and seven minutes.

(R., pp.157-158.)

Especially telling in the view of the court was that the officer, to no discernible purpose
relating the Mr. Smith's offense of speeding, called for the assistance of another officer.
(R., pp.157-159.) The court also noted that the officer performed two separate checks

for warrants on Mr. Smith. (R., p.157.) Given the court's detailed examination of the
objective actions of Officer Scheierman, which are supported by substantial and
competent evidence, this Court should uphold the trial court's express and implicit
findings of fact that Mr. Smith's detention was unlawfully extended and that the officer
did not employ the least intrusive means in investigating Mr. Smith's speeding offense.
See Frank, 133 Idaho at 367.

Although the district court disagreed with Officer Scheierman's belief that he had
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity following the officer's observations

Mr. Smith does not concede in this appeal that the mere fact that the officer believed
Mr. Smith's eyes to have been glassy, coupled with a two-second conversational pause,
a messy car, and an absence of luggage, constitutes reasonable suspicion that a crime
has been committed.
2
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upon his initial contact with Mr. Smith, the court's discussion of the issue of reasonable,
articulable suspicion was limited to whether the circumstances known to Officer
Scheierman justified the intrusiveness and the extension of Mr. Smith's detention. (R.,
pp.158-159.)
But more central to the court's conclusion was the absence of any evidence that
Officer Scheierman was actually pursuing the supposed purpose of Mr. Smith's
detention throughout the traffic stop. The district court noted that, in the normal course
of a traffic stop, "the officer is likely writing the ticket while he/she awaits the results of
the nationwide search." (R., p.157 n.13.) The court took note of this in conjunction with
the court's finding that Officer Scheierman never wrote nor issued any ticket for the
offense that purportedly formed the basis of the traffic stop in this case.

(R., p.157.)

The absence of any evidence that the officer was engaged in issuing a traffic citation at
any point, despite the fact that Mr. Smith's detention was supposedly based upon his
speeding offense, was at the heart of the district court's decision on Mr. Smith's motion
to suppress the State's evidence. (R., pp.157-162.) And this, too, was a determination
made by the trial court based upon the objective evidence, not on any particular belief
or state of mind on the part of Officer Scheierman.
As was noted by the district court, Officer Scheierman's actions in this case are
analogous to those found to have unlawfully extended the traffic stop in Aguirre. See

Aguirre, 141 Idaho at 562-564. In Aguirre, officers were suspicious of the defendant's
driving pattern during a traffic stop of another motorist and were familiar with his past
criminal history. Aguirre, 141 Idaho at 561. When the defendant failed to come to a
complete stop before entering the roadway from a parking lot, the officers decided to
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follow Mr. Aguirre and eventually pull him over for his traffic infraction. Id. However,
almost immediately after pulling the defendant over, the officers in Aguirre abandoned
any efforts at enforcing the traffic violation, and instead sought permission to search the
defendant's vehicle and conducted a "drug dog sniff" of the car. Id. at 561-563.
The Aguirre court noted that the officer's actions operated to extend the duration
of the traffic stop without legal justification - and that the actions that extended the stop
bore no relation to the traffic offense that justified the initial detention. Id. at 563-564.
Even where the extension of the stop is less than two minutes in total, this may
constitute "an unwarranted intrusion upon the vehicle occupant's privacy and liberty."
Id. at 563. Central to the Aguirre court's holding was the finding that the officers had

abandoned the purpose that justified the stop - the issuance of a citation for the traffic
offense. Id. at 564.
The same is true of this case, and the district court rightly noted as much. (R.,
pp.157 -162.) In fact, Officer Scheierman admitted that Mr. Smith never even received a
citation for his traffic offense at any point during his lengthy detention. (Tr., p.26, L.23p.27, L.12.) There is no objective evidence that the officer made any effort to pursue
the purpose that justified Mr. Smith's initial stop - his traffic infraction for speeding other than the officer's statement of his personal intention to do so. (Tr., p.26, L.23 p.27, L.12.) To the contrary, all of the officer's actions demonstrate that he was focused
on investigating whether there was any unrelated criminal activity afoot, as is evinced by
the fact that Officer Scheierman apparently never even began to write any citation for
the traffic offense.
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Accordingly, the district court correctly ruled that Officer Scheierman abandoned
the purposes of the traffic stop and unlawfully extended the duration of this stop prior to
the time the officer observed Mr. Smith to have "glassy" or "glazed over" eyes. The
court's order was well-reasoned and was rooted in an examination of the totality of the
circumstances -

including Officer Scheierman's actions as they related to a

determination of the objective purpose in extending the traffic stop as well as the
officer's inaction with regard to pursuing the traffic stop following his initial contact with
Mr. Smith.

This is precisely the examination that is required under the Fourth

Amendment. See State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426,430 (Ct. App. 1996).
While Mr. Smith does agree with the district court's ultimate holding that the
traffic stop of Mr. Smith was unlawfully extended and the purpose of the traffic stop
abandoned, he asserts that the district court did err in its determination that the stop
was not also unlawfully extended by the protracted questioning by Officer Scheierman
on matters entirely unrelated to the speeding violation, by the officer running a second
search on Mr. Smith's license and registration once Officer Scheierman was informed
that Mr. Smith had a valid Colorado license with no outstanding warrants, and by the
officer's subsequent pat-down search of Mr. Smith when he was ordered out of the car.
(R., p.159.) In addition, Mr. Smith further asserts that the means used by the officer in

these actions were unnecessarily intrusive, and therefore the district court correctly
determined that suppression of the State's evidence was the appropriate remedy.
As was noted, this Court reviews de novo constitutional principles as they relate
to the facts found by the district court.

Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 485-486; State v.

Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 360 (Ct. App. 2000) (addressing for the first time on appeal
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the issue of whether the officer's questioning and the use of a drug detection dog
caused the detention to be unnecessarily intrusive because the reasonableness of the
detention was "a question of law requiring our independent review."). In addition, where
the district court's order is correct, but on an alternate legal theory, this Court will affirm
on the correct grounds.

State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704 (1996).

Because the

officer's two periods of questioning of Mr. Smith, the pat-down search of him for
weapons, the multiple series of questions unrelated to the traffic offense, and the
duplicative nationwide search for other licenses clearly extended the duration of the
traffic stop in this case, and because the officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion
for this extension, Mr. Smith submits that this Court should likewise affirm the district
court on these grounds as well.
Turning first to the officer's prolonged questioning of Mr. Smith on matters
unrelated to his offense of speeding, Mr. Smith asserts that this unlawfully prolonged his
detention and was more intrusive than necessary to effectuate his detention for
speeding. With regard to the questioning of the defendant on matters unrelated to the
basis of a traffic stop, "[i]n each case, a court must analyze whether the police conduct
was more intrusive or of longer duration than reasonably necessary to effectuate the
investigative detention otherwise authorized by Terry."

Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 362.

Questioning about matters unrelated to the traffic stop is constitutionally permissible, but
only so far as the questioning does not meaningfully extend the duration of the stop. Id.
at 361-363.

But the questioning in this case, both prior to and following the officer's

initial check of Mr. Smith's license and registration, did significantly extend the duration
of the stop, and therefore was not permissible.
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In Parkinson, the questioning of the defendant about matters unrelated to the
traffic offense was permissible because it was occurring concurrently with the officer
running a check on the defendant's license and registration. Parkinson, 135 Idaho at
361-363.

In this case, when Officer Scheierman first began questioning Mr. Smith

about matters unrelated to his speeding offense, he was not concurrently taking action
in furtherance of issuing a citation.

(R., pp.53, 71-72.)

Additionally, Mr. Smith

acknowledged his violation from the beginning of his encounter with the officer, so there
was no need for any further investigation into the traffic offense at all. (R., pp.53, 76.)
In Officer Scheierman's estimation, this initial questioning extended the traffic stop by
five to seven minutes. (R., pp.80-81.)
Other cases have also sanctioned brief questioning on matters unrelated to the
traffic stop where the questioning was supported by the officer's specific, personalized
knowledge of the defendant or of circumstances amounting to reasonable suspicion.

See state v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 984-985 (Ct. App. 2003) (identifying ten separate
factors within the officer's knowledge that provided reasonable, articulable suspicion of
criminal activity).

Here, however, the officer possessed no such information.

Such

questioning is also permissible when it lasts only a matter of seconds, as this is not
deemed to meaningfully extend the duration of the stop. See, e.g., State v. Ramirez,
145 Idaho 886, 889-890 (Ct. App. 2008). But in this case, the questioning appears to
have been prolonged. Mr. Smith immediately acknowledged the speeding violation and
provided his license and registration. (R., pp.53, 76.) However, the officer estimated
that his initial contact with, and questioning of, Mr. Smith lasted for between five to
seven minutes. (R., pp.80-81.) During this period of time, Officer Scheierman was also
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using his questioning of Mr. Smith as an opportunity to look through his car during the
interrogation. (R., p.152.)
In addition, the officer received no new information between his initial questioning
of Mr. Smith and his second set of questions that would provide reasonable, articulable
suspicion for his continued questioning on matters unrelated to the traffic offense. In
fact, the information that the officer did receive in the interim actually dispelled, rather
than provided, any suspicion of criminal activity. A check of Mr. Smith's license and
registration in Colorado came back to the officer as revealing that he had a valid license
and no outstanding warrants. (R., pp.53, 82.) Accordingly, both sets of questioning of
Mr. Smith regarding matters unrelated to his traffic offense both unlawfully extended the
duration of his detention and were unnecessarily intrusive.
Second, there was likewise no objectively reasonable basis for Officer
Scheierman to have run a second, nationwide search for additional licenses or arrest
warrants once the officer had received information that Mr. Smith had a valid driver's
license with no arrest warrants from Colorado.

Officer Scheierman, at the time of

prolonging Mr. Smith's detention to run an additional search for all 50 states, had no
reason to believe that Mr. Smith had committed any criminal offense, had any criminal
history, or had a license anywhere other than Colorado. In fact, he had been informed
that Mr. Smith had a valid license in Colorado and no outstanding warrants. (R., pp.53,
82.) While the state-specific search took only one minute to complete, the additional
check added approximately five minutes to the length of the detention to complete. (Tr.,
p.14, L.13 - p.15, L.24.)

The State presented no evidence as to why Officer

Scheierman would need to search for warrants in every state in the country in order to
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complete a traffic stop for speeding, particularly when he had been informed that
Mr. Smith had a valid driver's license and no warrants in his home state of Colorado. 3
Finally, because the officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to have
conducted a pat-down search of Mr. Smith, Officer Scheierman's actions of doing so
likewise unlawfully extended the duration of the traffic stop.

The case of State v.

Henage is instructive on this point, as that case sets forth the standards for when a patdown search of an individual stopped for a traffic offense is permissible. In Henage, the
defendant was stopped for having a broken taillight. State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655,
658 (Ct. App. 2007).

Upon exiting the vehicle, the defendant in Henage was asked

whether he had any contraband on his person, to which the defendant replied that he
had a knife. Id Based upon this response, the officer conducted a pat-down search of
Mr. Henage which ultimately resulted in the discovery of drug paraphernalia and
methamphetamine. Id
The Court in Henage determined that there has no lawful basis for the pat-down
search of the defendant. Henage, 143 Idaho at 661-662. While the officer in Henage
testified that the defendant appeared nervous and admitted to having a knife, the
Henage Court held that this was not sufficient to demonstrate the specific, personalized
and articulable facts that would support such a search. Id The Court therefore held
that, "[w]eapons searches are not justified by an officer's subjective feeling, especially

The fact that the officer may engage in similarly intrusive searches with other motorists
during routine traffic stops is not relevant to this analysis, as the pertinent issue is
whether the actions of the officer were the least intrusive means of investigating the
basis of the detention without unnecessarily extending the stop, and because this Court
applies an objective standard to this determination. That the officer may also violate
other individual's constitutional rights in equal measure as part of the officer's "routine"
does not sanction the particular constitutional violation that occurred in this case.
3
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when that feeling is not particularized to a particular individual in a particular fact
situation." Id. at 662.
In this case, there was even less of a basis for Officer Scheierman to claim any
justification for the pat-down search of Mr. Smith. The sole basis proffered by the officer
was, "I first - I first ya know [sic] officer safety patted Mr. Smith down for weapons, he
was smoking a cigarette - had him extinguish that, just for safety purposes as welL"
(R., p.84.) There was never any evidence in the record of any particularized basis for
the officer to conclude that Mr. Smith was presently armed and posed a threat. While
the record does not reflect the duration of this search of Mr. Smith's person while
outside his car, it is clear that this would have extended the duration of the stop
because such searches inherently take time to perform. (R., p.84.) Moreover, this was
not a consensual exchange - the officer's actions of physically patting Mr. Smith down
for weapons carried with them an "accusatory tenor" that is not indicative of voluntary
interactions with police.

See State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 651 (Ct. App. 2002).

Because this search was not supported by any reasonable suspicion that Mr. Smith was
armed and presently dangerous, and because this further extended the duration of his
traffic stop without legal sanction, Mr. Smith asserts that this extension further supports
the district court's legal conclusion that the stop was unlawfully extended.
In addition, these methods were not the least intrusive methods that could have
been used by the officer in conducting the detention that was supposedly for the
purpose of issuing a traffic citation for speeding. The investigative methods deployed
for brief investigative detentions "should be the least intrusive means reasonably
available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicions in a short period of time." Royer, 460
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U.S. at 500; see also Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 305-306. The detention at issue was for
speeding, and yet virtually none of Officer Scheierman's actions appear to have been
directed at this purpose.

Rather than issue a citation upon being informed that

Mr. Smith had a valid license and no arrest warrants from Colorado, the officer engaged
in an exploratory search of every other state to look for any indication of unrelated
criminal activity or warrants.

During this duplicative search, which turned up no

evidence of any other licenses or arrest warrants, the officer removed Mr. Smith from
his car to perform a pat-down search his person. The only invocation of the basis for
doing so was Officer Scheierman's fleeting reference to officer safety.

Finally, the

officer - instead of writing out a citation for speeding - returned to question Mr. Smith
further about matters unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop.

Taken together,

Mr. Smith submits that the actions of the officer during his detention were far more
intrusive than was necessary to pursue the detention for his traffic offense. Accordingly,
he submits that this Court should affirm the district court's order on this basis as well.
The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that, "an investigative detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."

Royer, 460 U.S. at 500. In this case, the actions of Officer Scheierman, from the time of
his initial contact with Mr. Smith, objectively evince that the officer extended the stop
well beyond the time necessary to effectuate the purpose of the traffic stop for
speeding. Because of this, the district court did not err in granting Mr. Smith's motion to
dismiss on the basis that his detention was unlawfully extended in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Smith respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order
granting his motion to suppress the State's evidence.
DATED this 30 th day of July, 2012.

SARAH E. TOMP~S
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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